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A considerable body of evidence shows that performance-related pay schemes can raise worker 
productivity with much of this increase due to worker sorting. However, variations in the power 
of performance-related pay contracts are rarely observed. The thoroughbred horse racing 
industry offers such an opportunity. Contrary to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker 
shirking when the power of incentive contracts is reduced through jockeys switching from 
complete performance-related pay schemes into a salaried (retainer) contract. Moreover, salary 
contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance continuing for elite jockeys even 































Linking performance to pay is a standard mechanism to ensure goal congruency between 
owners (principals) and workers (agents) in settings of imperfect monitoring where moral 
hazard possibilities arise. A significant body of research now exists examining the impact of 
performance-related pay schemes on worker productivity. Many studies show that the 
introduction of a performance-related pay scheme can increase worker effort and worker 
productivity (e.g. Gielen et al., 2010). The underlying theory has the cost of effort as convex 
in effort with rising marginal cost of effort. In Lazear’s seminal (2000) study of windscreen 
fitters at the Safelite company, worker productivity improved when the option of a piece-rate 
payment system was introduced alongside straight salary payment. Moreover, Lazear found 
that around one-half of the worker productivity increase was due to worker sorting. The piece-
rate payment method attracted more skilled and motivated workers who were confident of 
securing  increased earnings under the piece-rate system.  
 
Identifying labour markets such as this, where incentive mechanisms are amenable to empirical 
analysis, is a challenging task. In this paper, we turn to the horseracing industry, a sport with 
ample data on worker pay and performance. We aim to test for the effects of variations in the 
power of incentive contracts on a specific group of workers, jockeys participating in the British 
thoroughbred horse racing industry. In particular, our data set presents a unique opportunity to 
consider variations in the power of incentive contracts in two directions. Unusually, several of 
the jockeys we consider switched into a risk-free salaried contract whilst keeping an incentive 
component of pay linked to prize money earned from successful racing. This had the effect of 
diluting the power of the performance-related incentive contract. Some jockeys also switched 
in the reverse direction, losing their annual salaried status and reverting to performance-related 
pay, where pay is determined by appearances (riding fees) and prize money. For these jockeys, 
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the power of incentive contracts was enhanced. To our knowledge, empirical evidence on 
performance-related pay effects on worker productivity has not thus far considered two-sided 
switching into and out of a performance-related pay scheme. 
 
Why is the horseracing industry appropriate to investigate performance-related pay? First, it 
offers a reasonably controlled environment where there is an unambiguous principal-agent 
relationship. This environment contains both occupational risk (through jockey injury and loss 
of selection to ride horses) and moral hazard possibilities as jockey and horse performances are 
hard to separate.  Second, the jockey labour market adopts clear mechanisms to improve 
incentive compatibility between owners and jockeys. The payment system to freelance jockeys 
includes a fixed remuneration unrelated to performance (riding fee) and a variable 
remuneration (prize money), linking pay to performance. This exists on a decreasing scale, 
from winning a race through to being placed second, third, fourth, and occasionally lower 
ranked positions.  Additionally, a limited number of jockeys are paid a substantial annual salary 
(a ‘retainer’) by an elite owner. This enhances the fixed riding fee and any potential share of 
prize-money for the jockey but gives owners/trainers exclusive rights over a jockey’s services 
for a set period. Importantly, retained jockeys still earn shares of prize money generated, similar 
to freelance jockeys, so the fixed retainer salary is over and above the variable component of 
salary generated by rides and prize money. Since prize money is inherently uncertain for 
jockeys and owners, the retainer salary offers risk-free income to the jockey and a retainer 
salary will be preferred by a jockey who is risk-averse over income. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reports empirical evidence on the effects of 
performance-related pay schemes in various settings. Section 3 provides context to the 
horseracing industry in Great Britain and shows how jockey contracts are typically structured. 
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Section 4 outlines the data used to examine the empirical question and describes our model 
used for the empirical tests. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the results and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
There is a considerable body of evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of performance 
related payment schemes in a wide range of settings. In addition to Lazear (2000), studies 
include Banker et al. (1996) on American manufacturing workers, Paarsch and Shearer (1999) 
on Canadian tree planters, Bandiera et al. (2005) on UK fruit pickers, Gielen et al. (2010) on 
Dutch manufacturing workers, Heywood et al. (2011) on Chinese academics and Bun and 
Huberts (2018) on Dutch sales workers. Along with Lazear (2000), sorting effects on worker 
productivity and earnings have been demonstrated by Cadsby et al. (2007), Lemieux et al. 
(2009), Dohmen and Falk (2011) and Shaw (2015).  
 
However, there is also a literature pointing to unintended consequences of piece-rate and 
other performance-pay schemes. According to recent research, performance-related pay does 
not necessarily deliver ‘true’ increases in productivity and may generate worker absences in a 
team context (Frick et al., 2013). Group bonuses and profit-sharing schemes are fraught with 
free-riding problems (Bogaard and Svejnar, 2018; Delahaie and Duhautois, 2019). 
Unintended consequences of performance-related pay include worker injuries (Bender et al., 
2012) and increased use of harmful substances (Artz et al., 2020). Moreover, in the United 
Kingdom performance-related pay schemes are not as prevalent as theory might suggest and 
are located primarily in the financial services sector (Bryson et al., 2017). Performance-
related pay schemes may be costly to enact. Freeman and Kleiner (2005) found that 
shoemakers in the United States delivered lower productivity when a piece-rate pay scheme 
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was abandoned in favour of a fixed salary. However, company profitability increased due to 
the higher incentive-related costs of implementing the previous piece-rate pay scheme. 
 
Agency theory has been applied to sports data in the past, to examine decision making by sports 
administrators (Mason, Thibault and Misener, 2006) and sports referees (Sutter and Kocker, 
2004; Dohmen and Sauermann, 2016; Butler and Butler, 2017). However, despite anecdotal 
evidence of principal-agent problems in sport, limited attention has been paid to the area. This 
is largely due to the absence of contract data in the public domain and difficulties in quantifying 
individual performance, particularly in team sports, where a group of players contribute to an 
outcome.  
 
A number of notable exceptions to this exist for professional football. Bryson, Buraimo and 
Simmons (2011) examined football referees and find that a treatment group of salaried referees 
delivered improved performance compared to a control group of referees still on match fees. 
This suggests that a well-judged salary payment scheme, with appropriate worker selection, 
can deliver benefits over a scheme based on appearance fees. Miklos and Ullrich (2016) find 
shirking to be a problem amongst Bundesliga players prior to the 2008 UEFA European 
Championship Finals, with players regularly picked to represent their national team reducing 
effort levels, possibly to avoid injury or fatigue. However, the opposite effect is found when 
the chance of selection for the national team is not guaranteed. These intermediate players were 
found to exert higher levels of effort in order to gain selection to the national team squad. 
Recently, using distance run as a proxy for effort, Weimar and Scharfenkamp (2019) report a 
reduction in player exertion once a contract has been agreed with an outside agent. While this 
effect does not spread to the team, the authors argue for more nuanced contract design so that 
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incentive mechanisms can be employed as a contract runs out in order to maximise player 
effort. 
 
In a precursor to our study, Fernie and Metcalf (1999) argue that horse racing offers an extreme 
example of an occupation where there is an incentive to shirk. Although jockeys are required 
by rule to race horses to the best of their abilities, jockeys can blame poor race outcomes on 
horse and track conditions or horse attitude (Coffey and Maloney, 2010). Favoured industry 
phrases are ‘the horse did not like the trip’ or ‘the going (track conditions) did not suit the 
horse’. Fernie and Metcalf (1999) demonstrate how a variable payment scheme delivered 
alignment of incentives between jockeys and their employers in Great Britain, where jockey 
performance is isolated in a particular metric (that we also use). The formula for payment is a 
fixed riding fee per race (appearance money) plus a given proportion of prize money where 
winning carries a higher weight than finishing in a designated place behind the winner. 
Incentive payments, in the form of a share of prize money, have facilitated the crucial alignment 
of performance-related bonuses and jockey effort.  
 
Fernie and Metcalf (1999) used descriptive evidence to argue that jockeys who switched from 
the variable payment scheme to a fixed salary delivered inferior performances. Coffey and 
Maloney (2010) corroborate the incentive element of Fernie and Metcalf (1999), using 
American horse racing and comparing this with greyhound racing without jockeys. They argue 
that jockeys increase effort levels when the returns to success are greater. 
 
For many employers, technology has dramatically reduced monitoring costs in recent decades. 
The horse racing industry provides a microcosm for this. Recording and broadcasting of racing 
gradually increased in the 1980s with terrestrial channels broadcasting a selection of races each 
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Saturday. However, relatively few races were televised. Monitoring costs for owners 
(employers of both trainers and jockeys) fell around the turn of the millennium with the advent 
of satellite channels such as Racing UK and Attheraces. Today every race run in Great Britain 
is available to watch live on either free-to-air television or subscription channels Racing TV or 
Sky Sports Racing. All stakeholders can watch the evolution of each race, the performance of 
horses, and importantly, judge the effort exerted by jockeys.1 
 
Fernie and Metcalf (1999) document the entry into the British horse racing industry of a group 
of wealthy Arab racehorse owners in the 1990s. Over time, these owners developed a complex 
network of stables, trainers and jockeys. The owners employed racing executives, responsible 
for hiring and firing trainers and jockeys, and practised increased monitoring at low cost given 
the wide availability of video playbacks. Elite jockeys were offered fixed salary contracts 
(retainers) as owners wanted exclusive access to their services. The authors attributed their 
observation of poorer performance of retained jockeys to moral hazard and shirking effects due 
to the fixed salary contract. However, over time it appears that the new Arab owners did devote 
resources to increased monitoring through data-driven performance evaluation of jockeys, 
trainers and horses. This mirrors the general growth of sport analytics in the 2000s, largely 
stimulated by the best-selling book on Major League Baseball, Moneyball, by Michael Lewis 
(2004). Two decades on from Fernie and Metcalf’s original study, it is worth revisiting jockey 
pay and performance data to test whether salaried contracts really do detract from jockey 
performance. 
 
3. THE HORSE RACING INDUSTRY IN GREAT BRITAIN 
The British Horseracing Authority (BHA) administers horse racing in Great Britain. This body 
is “responsible for the governance, administration and regulation of horseracing and the wider 
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horseracing industry” (BHA, 2020a). The three main stakeholders in any horse are the owner, 
trainer and jockey. According to the BHA (2018a), this tri-party relationship extended to 
approximately 14,000 registered owners, 600 licensed trainers and 450 licensed jockeys, as 
well as 300 amateur riders, in 2017. Given the complexities involved in this arrangement, a 
variety of different incentive mechanisms are used in order to elicit maximum performance 
from jockeys. These include both fixed and variable payment systems, with the latter dependent 
upon performance, and long-term retainer contracts for elite jockeys. The varying schemes 
trigger differing labour supply responses from individual jockeys.  
 
In 2019 there were 916 flat race meetings scheduled throughout England, Scotland and Wales 
with 562 ran on turf and 354 ran on all-weather tracks (BHA, 2020b). Flat turf attracts the most 
expensive yearlings and involves racing over distances ranging from five furlongs to around 
two miles, normally between March and October. Flat all-weather involves running on a 
synthetic surface over similar distances and the same calendar months.  
 
A registered owner in Great Britain today has between one, and in some cases, hundreds of 
horses in training at any time. Aside from the thrill of winning, and the potential residual 
breeding value of stallions and mares once retired, prize money principally drives the 
motivation for running horses.2 This is a considerable sum of money, and in 2018 across all 
racing codes in Great Britain was in excess of £161 million. Evidence of this is presented in 
Table 1.  
 
In order to be permitted to ride at British racecourses, all jockeys are required to hold a riding 
licence. Those that do acquire a licence become apprentice or conditional jockeys. An 
apprentice is used to describe flat jockeys (turf and all-weather) that are under 26 years of age 
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and have ridden less than 95 winners on-course. A conditional jockey rides in National Hunt 
races and is under 26, having ridden fewer than 75 winners. Due to their inexperience, these 
jockeys are supported by the handicapping system. This system attempts to improve 
competitive balance by allowing inexperienced jockeys to carry lower weight within races. 
There is very little churn in the profile of the top 50 jockeys in both flat and National Hunt 
racing, and jockeys have considerable longevity, with many riding into their 40’s or 50’s at an 
elite level. As suggested above, professional jockeys earn income from direct race activities in 
three main ways: fixed riding fees, share of prize money and retainer contracts.  
 
TABLE 1 - TOTAL AND AVERAGE PRIZE MONEY AT BRITISH RACECOURSES 
2014 – 2019 
 
The Professional Jockeys Association (PJA) collectively represents jockeys. One of the 
primary functions of the PJA is the negotiation of fixed riding fees with racing authorities. 
Table 2 presents the fixed fee payment to professional flat jockeys from 2000 to 2019. If a 
jockey rode in seven races at a typical flat race meeting, during the 2019 season, they would 
accumulate £889.89 in gross income. This does not include performance-related pay in the 
form of prize money, of which professional jockeys are entitled to 6.9 per cent, when winning 
a race, and 3.5 per cent for a place (2nd to potentially 4th, and lower in some cases). 
 
TABLE 2 - PROFESSIONAL FLAT JOCKEYS RIDING FEE 2000 – 2019 
 
The final source of income for professional jockeys is a retainer contract. Retained jockeys are 
considered as the elite performers in the sport and are selected by owners, racing managers and 
trainers based on past performance. Retainer contracts are agreements between jockeys and 
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either trainers or owners, the details of which remain private. It is almost unheard of that a 
jockey would turn down the offer of a retaining contract from an elite trainer or owner. This is 
simply because the guaranteed income of a retainer contract (six-figure sums, sometimes 
exceeding £1 million per season), will surpass any income that could be earned as a freelance 
jockey (Racing Post, 2018a; The Telegraph, 2012). The key feature of these contracts, and the 
reason some run into millions of pounds per season, stipulates that an elite jockey commits to 
riding for the paying retainer in all races where they have a runner. This does not prevent 
jockeys from riding for other owners and trainers when the retaining party does not have a 
runner in a particular race.  
 
Retainer contracts are renewable and always subject to performance review. Several jockeys 
have managed to sustain retainer contract status over long periods (see Table 4). When these 
contracts do cease it is normally by mutual consent of all parties: the jockey, trainer and owner.3 
Furthermore, once the contract is terminated, the jockey is free to ride for any owner or trainer. 
Such jockeys are known as freelance and make up the overwhelming bulk of professional 
jockeys riding in Britain. The group of freelance jockeys is therefore a combination of 
inexperienced or less successful jockeys (the vast majority of the group) and a selection of 
older, elite jockeys that previously held retainer agreements. Given the large degree of 
uncertainty surrounding retainer contracts, the often short-term nature of these agreements and 
the removal of riding options for elite jockeys who miss out on riding elite horses as they are 
tied to a single owner, the expected value of these agreements does not dramatically exceed 
that of freelance jockeys. For example, signing a retainer contract, which then lasts just one 
year, will impose a cost on the returning freelance jockey as they may have missed out on 
winning rides that they would otherwise have taken had they not been retained. 
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With more than 450 professional jockeys riding in Great Britain at any one time (Racing Post, 
2018a), this industry has many agents that can be observed. These agents work for hundreds of 
different principals (owners and trainers) over their careers. Given the large sums of prize 
money on offer during the racing season, elite jockeys can earn in excess of half a million 
pounds per year should they be successful in major races (Racing Post, 2019). However, the 
bulk of professional jockeys win very little prize money, and can report annual incomes as low 
as £30,000 to £35,000. This substantial income inequality is illustrated by the notably bowed 
Lorenz curve seen in Figure 1.  
 
***FIGURE 1 -  LORENZ CURVE - FLAT JOCKEY EARNINGS 2000-2015*** 
 
This shows the cumulative earnings of 454 flat jockeys in Britain over a recent fifteen-year 
period (Gini coefficient 0.898). The difference between elite jockeys and those at the bottom 
of the earnings distribution is driven almost entirely by prize money payments – successfully 
winning races or finishing in runner-up positions (places as determined by the number of 
entrants). As such, one would expect to observe greater levels of motivation, towards accessing 
potential bonus mechanisms, given the relative importance of prize money in determining 
annual income. For a typical freelance jockey in our sample, prize money income forms around 
60 per cent of total pay.  
 
4. DATA AND METHOD 
We examine the relationships between jockey pay, contractual status and performance for Flat 
racing in the Great Britain from 2000 to 2019. Flat racing is chosen given the availability of 
jockey performance data.  Our analysis considers the performance of 227 jockeys over 20 
seasons. 26 jockeys are identified as being on retainer contracts allowing for comparison with 
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freelance riders. All observations for individual jockeys are seasonal. It is not possible to 
employ jockey-race observations. However, these form part of the overall performance 
measure. In total, this allows for the consideration of jockey performance, both across races 
and within races, and results in more than 2 million jockey-horse combinations. Jockey pay is 
calculated using data from the Racing Post. Jockey performance is measured using data from 
Racing Research following the approach taken by Fernie and Metcalf (1999) and described in 
detail below. 
 
4.1 Racing Research and Jockey Performance  
Racing Research is an independent source that has analysed each race at a British racecourse 
since 1983 for flat racing. Racing Research form ratings require an extensive data collection 
process and are implemented by a custom-designed mathematical model acting on a results 
database which essentially captures the career record and performances of each horse, the 
associated conditions under which each horse has run and the multiple connections each has 
with all other horses it has raced against.  
 
On completion of a race, the Racing Research algorithm assesses the performance of both 
horses and jockeys, with computation of ratings a daily exercise. Each horse gets a rating based 
upon their performance within the race (direct comparison) and past performance competing 
against horses in other races (indirect comparisons), allowing for the calibration of multiple 
horse performances, over the course of a season. Ratings in previous races can be revised 
upwards or downwards once new information becomes available.  Revisions can be made as 
far back as six years for races run today.  For example, a race run in 2019 (last year considered 
in the data) could effect a rating assigned as early as 2013. This can affect both direct and 
indirect comparisons and allows for improvement in the performance of horses that was 
New Evidence on Jockeys’ Pay and Performance 
13 
 
otherwise not captured by the original application of the algorithm. As a very small proportion 
of flat horses in Great Britain run for more than six seasons, this updating allows for changes 
to be made covering the entire racing career of most horses. The entire set of ratings on the 
database is recomputed occasionally for the purposes of consistency.  
 
Importantly for the purposes of this research, the algorithm calculates jockey contribution to 
horse performance within a race, where the latter is dependent on many exogenous factors. 
This is largely unobservable and dependent upon many exogenous factors outside of the 
jockey’s control such as the quality of opposing horses and jockeys, horse odds, previous form, 
ground conditions, horse draw4 and in-race incidents. Jockey tactics which result in slower run 
races, undermine the accuracy of time ratings as an alternative performance metric. When 
reported time rates fall well below expected times, it is often the case that this was a result of 
how the race was run (slower pace) rather than the ability of the horses or jockeys, and enabled 
weaker horses to stay in the race longer. As a consequence time ratings are not as reliable and 
can under- or over-represent the real ability of a horse, and by extension jockey, on a race day. 
Form ratings overcome this problem and provide a far more accurate assessment of both horse 
and jockey performance.  
 
Using the form ratings, it is possible to assign a value to the performance of each jockey. This 
performance measure does not consider prize money awarded in any given race and as such 
should be considered as a measure of form rather than monetary returns. A jockey might win 
no prize money for an owner yet considerably overperform on their respective horse. As a 
result, their form rating would be much higher than expected. For example, Racing Research 
considers the performance of a horse, under ‘jockey X’, relative to other jockeys riding the 
same horse. This is calibrated so the performance measure for each jockey has a mean value of 
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10 lbs. Over a distance of 5 furlongs – the shortest run race – one length corresponds to a 
difference of 3 lbs. Over a distance of 2 miles, one length between a horse is the equivalent of 
1 lbs in weight. Importantly, the rating system controls for race-related effects such as distance, 
going and horse betting odds (probability of success). The value of this measure is that it covers 
thousands of rides each year to “expose what the rider is really contributing to his mount’s 
performance” (Whitley, 1992). Effectively, Racing Research strips out the marginal 
productivity of each jockey, in each race, for tens of thousands of races each year in Great 
Britain, by separating the performance of the horse from the jockey and the contribution of 
each actor to the race outcome. Summary statistics for 2000 to 2019 of this baseline measure 
of jockey performance are presented in Table 3. The mean value of 10 lbs applies to all years.  
 
TABLE 3 - SUMMARY STATISTICS OF RACING RESEARCH   
JOCKEY PERFORMANCE 
The benefit of using the Racing Research indicator is that it continually measures the 
performance of jockeys, and retrospectively calculates their contribution to past success, given 
the most current information of horse performance. Although many elite horses run a limited 
number of times per season (approximately 4-5 races), lower grade horses could run between 
10 and 20 times over the course of a calendar year. Frequent running often results in recurrent 
jockey changes. Therefore, controlling for the many race-related conditions, Racing Research 
can repeatedly measure the performance of the same horse with different jockeys. This analysis 
removes much of the subjectivity of assessing combined jockey and horse performance by 
instead relying on an algorithm constantly seeking to recalibrate past and present performance 
(Racing Research, 2019). To summarise, the advantage of the Racing Research measure is that 
it allows for the extraction of jockey performance from the myriad of potential factors affecting 
race outcomes.  
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4.2 Retained Jockey and Owners 
Retained jockeys do not work under the same incentive mechanisms as freelance jockeys since 
a large element of their pay (fixed salary) is independent of performance in the short run. In 
order to be considered a retaining owner, we assume the following criteria must be fulfilled. 
First, horses must be stabled with a British or Irish based trainer, over our sample period. 
Second, the retaining owner had to appear in the top ten of the Racing Post Total Earnings for 
Great British flat and all-weather racing at least three times between 2000 and 2019. Third, the 
owner must have accrued more than £1 million in prize money on average, for at least three 
seasons between 2000 and 2019. These criteria capture owners that consistently maintain a 
high volume of horses in Great Britain and Ireland and experience considerable success on a 
consistent basis. We identify seven retaining owners: Al Shaqab Racing, Ballydoyle Racing, 
Godolphin, Shadwell Racing, Khalid Abdullah, Qatar Racing and Sheikh Hamdan bin 
Mohammed Al Maktoum.5 Given our criteria, it can be reasonably concluded that this list 
consists of the elite owners racing horses in Great Britain.  
 
From these owners, 26 jockeys are identified as having signed retainer contracts with at least 
one owner between 2000 and 2019. Table 4 displays the retainer principal-agent relationships 
in our sample. For estimation, we observe 17 retained jockeys with matching Racing Research 
performance measures. Over the past twenty years, retained jockeys have tended to be well-
established in the sport. The mean age for the sample considered is 30.5 years, with a standard 
deviation of 7.68 and median age of 29.5 years.  
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4.3 Empirical Model 
To examine pay and performance under different contractual agreements, we estimate the 
following set of jockey fixed-effects regressions: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (1) 
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (2) 
 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼3 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (3) 
 
where: yi,t measures log total variable pay for jockey i in time period t. 
wi,t measures log riding fees for jockey i in time period t. 
vi,t measures log prize money for jockey i in time period t. 
Xi,t contains a vector of dummy variables to denote contractual status and a 
control variable for performance using Racing Research. 
ui,t is the error term. 
 
Jockey pay yi,t includes prize money accrued from wins and places during the season, where 
jockey prize money shares were fixed throughout our sample period, and the number of fixed-
fee riding payments received. wi,t and vi,t are components of the total variable pay for a jockey. 
Jockey pay excludes retainer contracts, which are additional to riding and prize money 
payments. Hence, jockey pay, riding fees and prize money each refer to incomes that all 
jockeys receive, regardless of contract type.  
 
The dummy variables, Xi,t,  for contractual status comprise Retainer (1 = any year in which a 
given jockey has a retainer contract), Before Retainer (1 = any retained jockey in each of three 
seasons prior to achieving retainer status) and After Retainer (1 = any season where a jockey 
has freelance status having been previously retained). The numbers of observations where these 
dummy variables were equal to one were 66, 48 and 51 respectively out of 1,283. 17 retained 
jockeys were observed before reaching their salaried contracts while nine retained jockeys were 
observed after leaving retainer contracts.   
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The three season threshold for assessing retained jockeys prior to their salaried contracts is 
arbitrary and modified below. Extending Before Retainer to all observed seasons gives 132 
observations where the dummy is coded as one. The purpose of the Before Retainer dummy is 
to assess whether jockeys who gain retainer status had higher total variable pay, riding fees and 
prize money in a given period prior to being selected.  
 
Next, we produce further estimations for jockey performances. We hypothesise that the 
owner’s utility is a function of wins and prize money earned (DeGennaro, 2003; Gamrat and 
Sauer, 2000). Owners enjoy visits to the winner’s enclosure and receiving any associated 
trophies. They also enjoy the pecuniary benefits of prize money although we should note that 
only a small number of racehorse owners make sustained positive returns from racing  given 
the high costs of owning, maintaining and training racehorses (Butler, 2021). On this basis, our 
additional dependent variables are number of wins and strike rate of jockeys (wins per ride). 
Again, the independent variables comprise dummy variables for contractual status and the 
Racing Research performance measure, identical to those used in the first regressions.  
  
Table 5 presents an overview of the retained jockeys performances. While the list of jockeys 
presented in Table 4 identifies 26 in total, six of these did not ride enough times during the 
period of their retainer contracts to be assigned a performance measure by Racing Research. 
The algorithm requires jockeys to ride in Great Britain a certain number of times in order for 
comparisons to be made both between jockeys on the same horse and on different horses. A 
lower number of observations would potentially bias the Racing Research metric and result in 
the reporting of possible over/under performance of a jockey. This would depend on the 
performance of the jockey in the limited number of rides within that particular season. In order 
to avoid this, jockeys with a limited number of racing observations are dropped from the Racing 
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Research comparison tool.   However, our results are qualitatively the same if the Racing 
Research performance measure is excluded and the omitted jockeys are brought back into the 
sample.  
 
For the estimations, jockey fixed effects are included to capture unobserved jockey-specific 
characteristics. Regression models use the raw measure of Racing Research performance as a 
control covariate. Performance is measured in three ways in the descriptive statistic (Table 5). 
First, we employ the Racing Post ordinal ranking in the two years prior to retainer status 
(2YBR), during retainer contract and two years post retainer status (2YPR).6 The Champion 
Jockey7 of flat racing in Great Britain each season obtains a rank of 1, with the second best 
jockey receiving a rank of 2, and so on. The Racing Post lists these jockeys, with the number 
of race wins the primary ranking criteria. Given the number of professional jockeys riding in 
Great Britain each season, the highest ordinal rank value will exceed 450. Second, we use the 
deviation from the 10 lbs Research Racing mean for before, during and after retainer status. 
Raw values of Racing Research are used in the regressions. Third, prize money won for the 
three time periods is listed.  
 
 TABLE 5 - SELECTED RETAINED JOCKEY PERFORMANCE 2008 TO 2018 
 
5. RESULTS 
Tables 6 to 8 present results for estimations of pay component models for all 227 jockeys from 
2000 to 2019 for which performance data were available. Recall that Fixed riding payments 
and prize money are the component parts of total variable pay. Retainer payments are excluded 
from this category. Results include jockey fixed effects and are presented with robust standard 
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errors, clustered by jockey. Year dummies are included to control for nominal increases in prize 
money over the sample period. 
 
TABLE 6 - DETERMINANTS OF LOG TOTAL VARIABLE PAY 
TABLE 7 - DETERMINANTS OF LOG RIDING FEES 
TABLE 8 - DETERMINANTS OF LOG PRIZE MONEY 
 
Racing Research has positive and significant coefficients in all three payment models from 
column (1) in Tables 6 to 8. The performance elasticities of total pay, riding fees and prize 
money are estimated at means as 0.46, 0.32 and 0.68, respectively. The higher elasticity for 
prize money received is to be expected.  From column (1), freelance jockeys earn £1,939 more 
in riding fees alone for each 1lb they are above the 10 lbs mean.  Better performing jockeys are 
rewarded by being booked by owners and trainers more frequently to ride horses.  
 
Column (2) of Tables 6 to 8 adds the Retainer dummy. The size of retainer income is unknown 
and our estimates show retained jockeys’ earnings as the variable component of their salary 
comprising riding fees and prize money. There is no significant difference in riding fees 
between retained and non-retained jockeys, suggesting they ride a similar number of horses. 
This is to be expected. Freelance jockeys are just as likely to book rides as retained jockeys. 
There is a limited number of retained jockeys, and the excess supply of horses in flat racing 
means freelance jockeys have no shortage of riding opportunities.8 
 
We find that retained jockeys earned more prize money for owners and themselves and 
received more total variable pay than non-retained jockeys. This finding contradicts the earlier 
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descriptive analysis of Fernie and Metcalf (1999) who argued that retained jockeys delivered 
lower prize money than their freelance counterparts.  
 
Column (3) adds the Before Retainer dummy. This has non-significant coefficients in all three 
payment regressions presented in Tables 6 to 8. However, the models in Column (3) are 
incomplete as they do not include the After Retainer dummy variable. Jockeys who switch out 
of salaried contracts might exhibit different variable income, riding fees and prize money 
compared to jockeys who never achieve retainer status. When After Retainer is added to the 
regressions in Tables 6 to 8 (Column (4)) we find that Before Retainer has positive and 
significant coefficients in each regression. 
In Table 7 estimates of Log Riding Fees, the coefficient on After Retainer is not significant. 
After losing retainer status, the numbers of rides between previously retained and ordinarily 
freelance jockeys are not significantly different. From column (4), jockeys that lose retained 
status deliver significantly higher prize money (Table 8) than their freelance counterparts. The 
positive coefficient on After Retainer is imprecisely estimated in the variable pay regression 
due to the inclusion of riding fees.  
 
If jockeys were shirking during their retainer contracts, we would expect them to earn higher 
prize money when they revert to the performance-pay formula. An F-test shows no significant 
difference in prize money earned after losing retainer status compared to the prize money 
generated while under retainer contracts (F = 0.93, p = 0.34). This contradicts the Fernie and 
Metcalf (1999) hypothesis of shirking while earning a fixed retainer salary. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 introduce estimations for two variables of interest to jockeys and racehorse 
owners: log wins and strike rate defined as wins per ride. Of these, we consider strike rate to 
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be a preferable measure of jockey performance since more rides simply offers more 
opportunities to win races. The columns are as specified for the jockey variables. Without 
contract status dummies, the performance elasticities of wins and strike rate from column (1) 
are 1.19 and 0.47 respectively. Each is statistically significant.  
 
TABLE 9 - DETERMINANTS OF LOG WINS 
TABLE 10 - DETERMINANTS OF LOG STRIKE RATES 
 
When the Retainer dummy is added in column (2), we find positive and significant coefficients 
on Retainer in the strike rate model (Table 10) but not the wins model (Table 9). From the 
results so far for strike rate and prize money, we conclude that retainer contracts do not act as 
a disincentive for jockeys to perform and win races and hence generate prize money for owners. 
This finding is again in contrast to Fernie and Metcalf (1999). Evidence of shirking by retained 
jockeys is not apparent from our estimates of strike rate and prize money.  
 
Column (3) in Tables 9 and 10 adds the Before Retainer dummy. The coefficient on this dummy 
variable is positive and significant for both wins and strike rate (Tables 9 and 10). Hence, 
before reaching retainer status, the selected jockeys had already produced more wins (Table 9), 
higher strike rate (Table 10) and more prize money earnings (Table 8) for their owners than 
non-selected, freelance jockeys. The hiring process appears to be broadly efficient in terms of 
selecting the best performing jockeys for retainer contracts. 
  
Adding After Retainer in column (4) of Tables 9 and 10 shows that jockeys returning to 
freelance contracts also produce higher strike rates than never-retained jockeys. The effect of 
After Retainer is imprecisely estimated in the wins model in Table 9. There appears to be a 
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‘legacy effect’ where jockeys who switch from retainer to freelance contracts continue to 
deliver higher strike rates (Table 9) and prize money (Table 8) for owners. We conjecture that 
the network relationships between jockeys, trainers and owners forged during retainer contracts 
persist even when these jockeys switch out of a retainer contract. Some previously retained 
jockeys depart by mutual consent with the understanding that they continue to ride for previous 
employers but on a freelance basis. Naturally, their original selection as a retained jockey, for 
a leading owner, was due to perceived enhanced ability relative to all other jockeys. It can be 
interpreted that their continued overperformance is also a consequence of them simply being 
better jockeys which is further exploited by the relationships and networks that have been 
developed whilst working as a retainer. 
 
Tables 11 and 12 present results of F-tests for coefficient equality for our contractual status 
dummies from the jockey prize money and strike rate models. We test whether the Retainer 
effect is greater than Before Retainer and After Retainer. For completeness, we test whether 
the After Retainer effect is larger than the Before Retainer effect. Tables 11 and 12 also report 
robustness checks on the measure of Before Retainer. Thus far, we have confined the pre-
retainer period to three years. We modify this to show results for i) all years before retainer ii) 
four years before and iii) two years before.  
 
The only systematically significant F-tests for differences in contractual status coefficients 
come from the Log Prize Money regressions where Retainer has a significantly greater 
coefficient than Before Retainer, regardless of the choice of period for Before Retainer. The 
tests essentially show step changes in jockey and owner prize money, from non-retained 
through to the period before a jockey is hired on a retainer, and a further uplift when elite 
jockeys achieve salaried status. This highlights the effectiveness of the owners’ selection 
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process where candidates for retainer contracts are already delivering greater prize money for 
owners prior to retained employment. 
TABLE 11 - DETERMINANTS OF LOG PRIZE MONEY WITH ALTERNATIVES FOR 
BEFORE RETAINER 
 
TABLE 12 – STRIKE RATE WITH ALTERNATIVES FOR BEFORE RETAINER 
 
The robustness checks suggest some nuanced contract status effects. In particular, the effect of  
Before Retainer on jockey prize money is statistically significant for two and three years but 
not for four years or all years. In the strike rate model, Before Retainer has a conventionally 
significant coefficient over two, three and four years but not for all years. We suspect that this 
discrepancy is due to promising young jockeys delivering high strike rates four years before 
they obtain retainer contracts but these strike rates tend to be associated with lower prize money 
compared to when these jockeys reach retainer status. Basically, early career jockeys tend to 
ride more at lower grade race tracks where less prize money is on offer. In the period five years 
or more before retainer status is achieved, jockeys are very recently licensed professionals and 
show no discernible variation in strike rate or prize money relative to more experienced 
freelance jockeys.   
6. DISCUSSION 
Our data set facilitates an analysis of sorting effects when workers switch out of performance-
related pay into a salaried contract and subsequently switch in the reverse direction. In 
personnel economics, such a data set is novel. Our results strengthen the predictable conclusion 
that, regardless of payment scheme, performance matters for worker and employer returns. 
More productive jockeys get a higher number of mounts, achieve higher strike rates, win more 
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prize money and earn more overall. When measuring performance using Racing Research, 
jockeys outperforming the mean earn significantly more across all payment categories.  
 
In a finding that appears at first surprising, elite retained jockeys significantly outperform 
freelance riders in wins, strike rates and prize money generated suggesting a degree of sorting. 
We find no systematic significant differences in the strike rate between jockeys, either before 
a retainer contract is agreed, during the retainer contract, or once the jockey’s agreement with 
an owner has lapsed. Therefore, there is no evidence that jockeys shirk when on retainer 
contracts. Furthermore, prize money won by retained jockeys for themselves and owners is 
significantly greater than prize money earned by the same jockeys up to three years before a 
retainer contract. This suggests that owners broadly hire the best jockeys on retainer contracts 
and the selection process is more than luck. 
 
Upon leaving a retainer contract, the elite group of jockeys continue to earn significantly more 
prize money than other freelancers. One interpretation of this result is that the high-profile 
nature of retainer agreements adds value for the jockey even after termination, with elite 
jockeys continuing to get the best rides on average. This would suggest that these agreements 
end, not because of underperformance, but instead naturally run their course with both parties 
content to end the retainer contract. Being previously retained as a jockey with an elite owner 
also carries a signalling quality for future jockey-trainer relationships. The exposure a jockey 
gets adds value and facilitates better quality rides per season and hence significantly more 
earnings, even after their retainer agreement has ended. This may explain why we find no 
significant difference between prize money won by jockeys during tenure of retainer contracts 
and after retainer contracts have expired.  
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A second possible interpretation is that jockeys, by virtue of their contact with leading stables 
and elite riding experiences, develop tacit skills and further hone their talent. Owners and 
trainers hiring jockeys, ex-post, could well benefit from a positive externality associated with 
the period where a jockey was incubated in a retainer contract. This interpretation implies that 
unobservable learning during the retainer could explain the greater level of prize money earned 
rather than a pure ‘exposure’ effect.  Of course, these two interpretations are not mutually 
exclusive.   
 
There are numerous possible explanations why our results differ substantially from Fernie and 
Metcalf (1999) two decades on. Improvements in technology, specifically the universal 
recording of all British racing, have dramatically reduced the monitoring cost of agents. This 
has allowed owners to monitor jockey performance far more readily than during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. As agents are aware that performance is always closely watched, this may act as 
a stimulus to exert maximum effort. A corollary to this is that owners can terminate retainer 
contracts if repeated underperformance from jockeys is evident. This is also true of the 
individuals they select as trainers. Both jockeys and trainers therefore have an incentive to 
continually perform when monitoring costs are low, even in races that are a much lower grade 
class. Moreover, it is clear that owners have invested resources in scientific and statistical 
performance evaluation of jockeys, trainers, horses and stables. This is all part of a learning 
process from previous mistakes in the hiring process for retained jockeys.  
 
We should point out that underperforming jockeys, or dissatisfied retaining owners, are not the 
only plausible reasons for the end of a retainer contract. Elite jockeys can choose to end these 
contractual agreements voluntarily. Having enhanced their reputations from high profile 
agreements, many jockeys have a standing within the sport that allows them to return to 
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freelance riding. The switch to freelance riding could be motivated by several factors. First, the 
commitments involved for retained jockeys can be exhausting. This includes a binding 
commitment to daily travel and repeated rides, some of which have very limited chance of 
success. In contrast, freelancers have the option to avoid onerous travel commitments and can 
strategically book rides. Second, high profile freelance jockeys occasionally have an option to 
select which horse they wish to ride in elite races. This is not the case when one is tied to a 
contractual arrangement with an owner. Third, many jockeys that choose to exit these contracts 
do so when they are moving to a mature stage of their careers. It may be that other 
commitments, such as family life, take precedence. The flexibility of freelance riding could be 
a more attractive proposition. Having built substantial reputations, many former retained 
jockeys continue riding, confident in the knowledge that they can still get the best rides and 
earn significant income. Furthermore, as international travel has become easier in recent 
decades these jockeys can ride regularly in other locations such as Ireland, France, the Middle 
East, Asia and Australia.  
 
Our findings on the positive relationship between retainer status and worker performance are 
in line with those of Bryson et al. (2011) on football referees. If workers are appropriately 
matched and selected, then salaried contracts can boost owner returns. Our results are also 
consistent with the sports literature on assortative matching where the best players gravitate to 
the best teams (Drut and Duhautois, 2017; Filippin and van Ours, 2015; Gandelman, 2008). In 
horse racing the best jockeys develop both formal and informal employment relationships with 
the best owners and trainers. Further research could usefully test for assortative matching in 
horse racing. 
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At a more general level our findings are important. The conditions required for the 
effectiveness of performance-related pay schemes, to raise worker productivity and output, are 
actually very strong. These conditions include measurability of worker productivity, a limited 
role for luck in variations of worker rewards and the absence of team production where co-
worker effects such as free-riding might become important. Not surprisingly, empirical studies 
of performance-related pay have tended to focus on very precise production settings where 
these conditions are broadly fulfilled e.g. tree planters and windscreen fitters. 
 
Once settings such as ours are considered, with highly skilled workers and specialised tasks, 
modelling the effects of performance-related pay need to come to terms with sorting of workers 
into pay schemes in a different sense. The sorting that we observe in our study is actually 
employer selection where the employer offers a limited number of salaried contracts to strongly 
performing candidates. Employer selection then has implications for workers’ future earnings. 
This shifts the focus of analysis to career concerns which are generally absent in studies of 
performance-related pay in manufacturing sectors. We suggest that future studies of the 
impacts of performance-related pay schemes should address employer selection and potential 
career concerns as factors in the analysis.    
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Variations in the power of performance-related pay contracts are rarely observed. The 
thoroughbred horse racing industry offers such an opportunity as elite jockeys are paid by 
annual salary (retainer) as well as receiving a share of prize money earned in races. We find a 
positive relationship between jockey pay and performance in this industry. However, contrary 
to earlier research, we find no evidence of worker shirking when the power of incentive 
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contracts is reduced through switching into retainer contracts. Retained jockeys deliver greater 
prize money for owners and themselves when compared with freelance jockeys.  
 
Our results show that jockeys about to be hired under retainer contracts are already 
outperforming other jockeys in wins and prize money even before they sign their contracts. 
This suggests that owners are well informed about jockey ability and performances before 
retainer contracts are signed – in recent times their screening practices have borne fruit.  
 
Moreover, retainer contracts result in legacy effects with superior performance, in wins and 
prize money, continuing for elite jockeys even after their retainer agreements have expired. We 
suggest that this is due to a reduction in monitoring costs in recent decades and enhanced 
opportunities for previously retained jockeys to make use of network contacts to ride 
successfully for large-scale racehorse owners in big races. This effect is worth further analysis 
in other settings. For example, a switch from an employment contract to self-employment 
might raise an individual’s earnings, albeit with greater risk, as reputation and network effects 
are carried over into self-employment. 




1. Historically, while trainers were almost always on-course, the same was and is not true 
of owners. This can largely be explained by two factors. Firstly, the trainer (or a member 
of the stable) is an essential element of race day. The horse needs to be transported, 
saddled up, walked to the paddock, collected after the race, etc. Secondly, the volume 
of racing in the UK means that most racing takes place during the week. Racing owners 
are typically engaged in other activities during the week. Unlike the trainer, owners are 
non-essential, and their presence at the race course is not required for the horse to run. 
The same is true of racing managers hired by distant owners. Many owners and 
managers are therefore not present at races, particularly at lower graded races, run from 
Monday and Friday. Prior to the advent of satellite channels such as Racing UK and 
Attheraces this would have meant been unable to watch a race live – unless present on-
course – and difficulty obtaining a recording, if such a race was filmed. 
2. See Gamrat and Sauer (2000), Ray (2001) and DeGennaro (2003) for a debate relating 
to owner motivations to maximise utility viz-a-viz profit. 
3. Cessation tends to be the exception rather than the rule. Rare examples include 
Godolphin’s decision not to retain Frankie Dettori for the 2013 calendar year and Davy 
Russell’s release at the end of 2013 by influential Irish owners Gigginstown.   
4. A draw refers to a horse’s starting stall. Given the heterogeneity of racecourses in Great 
Britain, the stall a horse is drawn from can dramatically affect their chances of winning. 
A wide draw (high number stall) at a racecourse with sharp bends can result in horses 
running considerably further than those with a low draw. 
5. Cheveley Park Stud also meet the criteria for a retaining owner but are excluded 
because they did not employee a designated retaining jockey for the period under 
examination. Rather, the owners use a combination of trainers and the stable jockeys 
used by each.  
6. In order to be assigned a value in 2YPR a selected jockey must have left their retainer 
no later than 2017 and remained a freelance jockey. 
7. The Champion Jockey of flat racing in Great Britain is the jockey who has ridden the 
most winning horses during a season. 
8. According to the BHA (2017), the average field size of a flat race in Great Britain has 
ranged between 8.22 and 10.56, over a ten-year period from 2007 to 2016. Further 
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Table 1: Total and Average Prize money at British Racecourses 2014 – 2019 
 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Flat (Turf )  
Total 
Prizemoney £68,361,000 £73,640,000 £74,383 £77,160,000 £86,617,000 £84,635,000 
Prizemoney 
per Race £17,180 £18,682 £19,088 £19,227 £22,064 £22,254 
              
Flat ( All-Weather)  
Total 
Prizemoney £14,019,000 £16,096,000 £17,971,000 £18,242,000 £25,487,000 £23,911,000 
Prizemoney 
per Race £6,020 £6,973 £7,547 £7,656 £9,549 £9,329 
              
National Hunt  
Total 
Prizemoney £40,609,000 £42,416,000 £45,224,000 £47,137,000 £54,515,000 £52,518,000 
Prizemoney 
per Race £10,695 £11,237 £12,102 £12,178 £14,302 £14,121 
              
Total  
Total 
Prizemoney £122,989,000 £132,152,000 £63,269,383 £142,539,000 £166,619,000 £161,064,000 
Prizemoney 
per Race £12,171 £13,183 £13,736 £13,881 £16,009 £15,970 
              




Table 2: Professional Flat Jockeys Riding Fee 2000-2019 
Year Riding Fee  Year Riding Fee 
2000 £68.17  2010 £106.55 
2001 £70.55  2011 £109.10 
2002 £73.40  2012 £112.37 
2003 £75.60  2013 £115.52 
2004 £80.55  2014 £118.29 
2005 £87.56  2015 £118.29 
2006 £92.65  2016 £118.29 
2007 £96.35  2017 £120.66 
2008 £100.44  2018 £124.40 
2009 £103.45  2019 £127.14 









Table 3: Summary Statistics of Racing Research Jockey Performance 
Year Mean Median St. Dev Min Max 
2000 10 10.0 1.60 6.0 13.8 
2001 10 10.3 1.56 6.5 13.1 
2002 10 10.3 1.55 5.9 13.0 
2003 10 10.0 1.43 7.0 12.8 
2004 10 10.5 1.42 6.9 12.9 
2005 10 10.2 1.63 4.1 12.6 
2006 10 10.4 1.32 6.6 11.9 
2007 10 10.1 1.31 6.3 12.4 
2008 10 10.1 1.33 6.8 13.4 
2009 10 10.1 1.32 6.7 13.1 
2010 10 10.1 1.30 7.3 12.6 
2011 10 10.2 1.13 6.5 12.2 
2012 10 10.1 1.05 7.3 12.1 
2013 10 10.3 1.18 6.0 11.9 
2014 10 9.9 1.17 7.5 12.8 
2015 10 10.0 1.02 7.8 12.2 
2016 10 10.3 1.01 7.2 12.0 
2017 10 10.1 0.83 8.4 11.7 
2018 10 10.0 1.10 6.9 12.0 
2019 10 10.1 1.15 6.3 11.8 
All Years 10 10.1 1.14 6.0 13.4 





























Table 4: Retainer Owner and Jockey Combinations  
 
Retaining 








Racing Lanfranco Dettori 2013 to present 44 - 
Coolmore 
Michael Kinane 1999-2003 40 0* 
Jamie Spencer 2004 24 16 
Kieran Fallon 2005-2007 40 9* 
Johnny Murtagh  2008-2010 38 4* 
Joseph O'Brien 2011-2014 18 2* 
Ryan Moore 2015 to present 32 - 
Godolphin 
Lanfranco Dettori 1994-2013 25 7 
Mickael Barzalona 2013 22 7 
Silvestre de Sousa 2013-2014 33 6 
Adam Kirby 2014 26 6 
James Doyle 2015 to present 27 - 
Wiliam Buick 2015 to present 27 - 
Shadwell Racing 
Richard Hills 1997-2012 34 0* 
Paul Hanagan 2013 -2016 33 4 
Dane O'Neill 2013 to present 38 - 
Jim Crowley 2017 to present 31 - 
Khalid Abdullah 
Richard Hughes 2001-2007 28 7* 
Tom Queally 2009-2012 25 8 
James Doyle 2013-2014 25 6 
Qatar Racing 
Jamie Spencer 2013-2014 33 6 
Harry Bentley 2013-2014 21 6 
Andre Atzeni 2015 24 5 




Joe Fanning 2013 to present 43 - 
Franny Norton 2013 to present 43 - 
Note: Observations must have signed a retainer agreement no later than the start of the 2019 racing season. “To 
present” refers to the end of the 2020 racing season. Ceiran Fallon was retained by Qatar Racing for the 2020 
season, but because he did not ride as a retained jockey in 2019 or earlier, is not included in the table. 
* Jockey now retired. 
** Tom Queally, although not officially retained by Khalid Abdullah, was a de facto retained jockey, riding   
star horse Frankel in all of his 14 starts and Midday in 18 of her 19 races between April 2009 and November 2011. 
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Table 5: Selected Retained Jockey Performance: 10 Year Period – 2008 to 2018 
  No. of Years 
Average Ordinal 
performance  
(rank, 1 = top) 
Average Cardinal 
performance: Deviation (lb) 
from mean of 10 lb 
Average Prize money won (£m) 











L Dettori Al Shaqab Racing 2013-2018 24, 42 6 5 33 45 - 0.8 - - 2.07 4.66 - 
S De Sousa Godolphin 2013-2014 2, 5 2 8 4 10 33 0.7 1.1 1.3 0.91 2.16 2.22 
A Kirby Godolphin 2014 8, 3 1 9 6 1 4 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.86 2.02 2.11 
J Doyle Godolphin 2015-2018 19, 10 4 7 15 10 - 0.9 0.2 - 1.14 2.92 - 
W Buick Godolphin 2015-2018 10, 8 4 7 9 17 - -0.4 N/A - 2.14 3.01 - 
L Dettori Godolphin 2008-2012 - 5 5 - 23 - - - - - 2.37 - 
P Hanagan Hamdan Al Maktoum 2013-2016 1, 7 4 6 4 14 15 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 1.48 2.40 1.52 
D O'Neill Hamdan Al Maktoum 2013-2018 20, 13 6 5 17 39 - 1.8 0.1 - 0.74 0.76 - 
J Crowley Hamdan Al Maktoum 2017-2018 8, 1  2 9 5 3 - 0.6 0.6 - 1.33 5.24 - 
R Hills Hamdan Al Maktoum 2008-2012 - 5 5 - 32 - - - - - 1.6 - 
J Spencer Qatar Racing 2013-2014 6, 11 2 8 9 19 16 0.5 0.2 -0.1 1.71 1.76 1.88 
A Atzeni Qatar Racing 2015 9, 9 1 9 9 25 10 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.93 3.39 3.36 
O Murphy Qatar Racing 2015-2018 53, 23 4 7 38 11 - -1.2 0.3 - 0.73 1.83 - 
T Queally Khalid Abdullah 2009-2012 15, 10 4 6 13 13 21 0.2 0.5 -0.2 2.72 2.21 0.85 










2013-2018 9, 1 6 5 5 5 - 0.8 0.3 - 0.91 1.54 - 
Source: Racing Post (2018b) and Racing Research (2019)
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Table 6: Determinants of Log Total Variable Pay 
Dependent Variable: 
Log Total Variable Pay 
 
   


















(0.010) (0.007) (0.001) 










R² (within) 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.30 
R² (overall) 0.30 0.35 0.37 0.43 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 
N jockeys 222 222 222 222 
Table 7: Determinants of Log Riding Fees 
Dependent Variable: 
Log Riding Fees 
 
   


















(0.604) (0.832) (0.794) 










R² (within) 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 
R² (overall) 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 




Note: In all regression tables, statistical significance is denoted by ***at 1% level; **at 5% level; *at 10% level.   
Robust p values, with standard errors clustered by jockeys, are in parentheses. 
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Table 8: Determinants of Log Prize Money 
Dependent Variable: 
Log Prize Money 
 
   


















(0.008) (0.006) (0.000) 










R² (within) 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.28 
R² (overall) 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.43 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 
 
 




   


















(0.153) (0.058) (0.009) 










R² (within) 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 
R² (overall) 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.34 
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(0.022) (0.014) (0.000) 










R² (within) 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.20 
R²  (overall) 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.41 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 
 
 
Table 11: Determinants of Log Prize Money with Alternatives for Before Retainer 
Dependent Variable: Log Prize Money 








































(0.046) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) 
F Retainer = After Retainer 1.22 0.92 0.93 0.96 
F After Retainer = Before Retainer 2.80 1.81 1.04 0.23 
F Retainer = Before Retainer 10.11*** 5.76** 4.83** 3.16* 
R² (within) 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 
R² (overall) 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.42 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 
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Table 12: Strike Rate with Alternatives for Before Retainer 
Dependent Variable: Strike Rate 








































(0.018) (0.003) (0.009) (0.022) 
F Retainer = After Retainer 0.70 0.36 0.46 0.50 
F After Retainer = Before Retainer 1.70 0.38 0.12 0.00 
F  Retainer = Before Retainer 9.17*** 2.38 1.98 0.95 
R² (within) 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 
R² (overall) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 
N 1283 1283 1283 697 
 
